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Abstract
This essay builds a simulation model of the government procurement based on Netlogo simulation platform. Three sets of 
experiments are designed and conducted to study the guidance effect on suppliers by the alteration of the design of the 
government procurement mechanism in three different situations. By studying on the results and changes in trends of a 
series of preinstall statistical indicators, we find out that the expected goal of improving social efficiency and the level of 
scientific and technological progress can be achieved by reducing resource consumption when policy guidance is in place.
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1. Introduction
After over 220 years of development and perfection, a relatively complete institutional system had thereby 
fostered in the western countries for government procurement. The government procurement in China started 
late both in mechanism design and practical operation. Theoretical probation in this field remained lagging and
superficial comparatively. Conventional measurement and analytic methods were limited when it comes to the
studies of government procurement, especially in research methods. However, the method of the agent-based 
simulation, because of the virtual advantages of its controllability and repeatability, offered a brand new 
solution for studies on government procurement behavior.
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1.1. Review of Research Abroad 
Buchanan[1] advocated a financial theory by the restoration of classical balanced budget, which reduced the 
scale of government expenditure for procurement, opposed blind use of government procurement to stimulate 
economic development and objected the implementation of government procurement with budget deficit. 
Doble (1986) reckoned that public procurement department fulfilled the functions of the custodian. McAfee, R. 
Preston and John McMillan(1989)made in-depth discussion on how to implement the government procurement 
cost minimization issue and put forward the auction model selection problem based on s (1981) 
optimal auction design theory.  McCue & Pitzer (2000) studied the characteristics and trends of centralized and 
decentralized government procurement. 
1.2. Review of Domestic Research 
Wang Pingping [2] found that if, based on trade-offs of price, quality, and corporate profits, the quality level 
of the competitive enterprise was exogenous and common knowledge, then optimal auction mechanism was 
likely to discriminate corporate that provided high-quality products. And Ma Li [3], Wang Caiyuan, Song 
Qiang [4], Xia Chenge, He Jialiang [5], Huang He, Chen Jian [6], Wu Liyan, Xi Xiangzhu, Wang Haijun [7], 
and Wu Jinqun [8] conducted in-depth studies on special content such as bidding mechanism, the competition 
mechanism, experts bid evaluation mechanism and combinatorial auction mechanism, operation mechanism 
and anti-corrosion mechanism respectively. 
2. Model Building 
2.1. Experiment Description 
(1)The Government 
In three sets of experiments, the government would give different signals to stimulate market, and the policy 
strength would show a gradually increasing trend. In the first set of experiments, the government would only 
consider the price factor. In the second set of experiments, the government would set procurement standards for 
the procurement target in line with the policy intent. In the third set of experiments, the government would 
subsidize suppliers who meet the principles of green procurement . 
(2) The Supplier 
In this experiment, functions relating to describing every supplier  included cost function, scientific and 
technological progress coefficient function and price function. 
 Cost Function 
1i i i iC F T w                                                                                                                            (2.1) 
i stands for any supplier in the simulation model. C stands for cost of production. F stands for the fixed costs 
of supplier, and we use such indicators to measure the level of scientific and technological progress of the 
supplier. In the simulation experiment, F ranged from 1 to 10. The range of F of  of "advanced" 
scientific and technological level was (7.5, 10], and the range of F of  of "Intermediate" scientific 
and technological level was [5.5, 7.5], and the range of F of  of "Lower" scientific and technological 
level was [1, 5.5).  
7 Zstands for the variable costs of suppliers, and we used such indicators to measure the amount of a 
variety of limited resources consumed by one unit of production of the procurement target of suppliers. And 
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there is a convertible negative equilibrium relationship  between it and F, which means that in the case of 
given procurement target output, if the "supplier" had paid larger fixed costs, the variable costs paid by 
suppliers for one unit of production of the procurement target would be lower. That is to say that the less 
various limited resources consumed by the supplier in the production process, the higher its level of scientific 
and technological progress would be, and vice versa. T stands for the standard variable costs of suppliers , 
which is a constant. In the simulation experiment, we set it as 1 . 
 Scientific and Technological Progress Coefficient Function 
W stands for the coefficient between fixed costs and variable costs of suppliers the scientific and 
technological progress coefficient. In the simulation experiment, we set W as a random, and the relevant 
function is 
 
5i
i
i
Fw
F                                                                                                                                            (2.2) 
The number 5  stands for the average level of scientific and technological progress of suppliers  in the 
experiment.  
 Price Function 
  
1i i iP C r                                                                                                                                   (2.3) 
P stands for the price level set by suppliers  themselves. r is a ratio which represents the profit level of 
suppliers . In the simulation experiment, we set r as a random that ranges from 0 to 1. 
1 Market-Clearing 
 In each procurement period, "government" would give out procurement signals to the simulation market. 
Each supplier  offered price of the procurement target to the simulation market.  Every winning supplier  
that entered the final procurement activities would produce 1 unit of the procurement target.  1 unit of 
original wealth would be deducted from the unsuccessful ones.  If the level of wealth of a supplier  was less 
than -10, then it would be  new suppliers  coming in.  At the end of each procurement 
period, the simulation market of government procurement would collect current market data. 
2 Statistical Indicators 
 Expenditure for procurement 
All the procurement target prices offered by the winning suppliers  were added as procurement costs  as 
well as statistical indicators to measure the total output of society . 
 1
n
E S t
t
G O P
                                                                                                                                  (2.4) 
GE stands for procurement costs , Os stands for the total output of society , t stands for any supplier  
who wins the bid and n stands for the exact number of the winning suppliers . In this experiment, we set n as 
30, which can be selected and adjusted according to the experimental requirements. 
 Distribution of the Level of Scientific and Technological Progress 
The general level of scientific and technological progress would be higher if number of the advanced  ones 
had grown larger and the lower  ones smaller.  
 Overall Consumption of Resources 
557 Xing Enquan et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  17 ( 2013 )  554 – 562 
In this experiment, we set this indicator as a sum of the variable costs paid by the winning suppliers  due to 
their production of the procurement target in line with the government  standard. 
 1
n
S t
t
R T
                                                                                                                                             (2.5) 
Rs stands for overall consumption of resources . 
 Social Efficiency 
In this experiment, we set this indicator as a proportion of the total social output  and the overall 
consumption of resources . 
   
S
S
S
OW
R                                                                                                                                              (2.6) 
Ws stands for social efficiency , and the larger the value of Ws, the higher the social efficiency  designed 
under the corresponding government procurement mechanism. In addition, we used this indicator to measure 
the adjustment and improvement efficiency of government procurement mechanism in this experiment. If 
social efficiency  gets promoted after the government made its decision on which procurement mechanism to 
be implemented, then this procurement mechanism could be defined economically efficient as a kind of Pareto 
Improvement  to the existing government procurement activities. It could be demonstrated by a formulation as 
follow: 
  , , 1S S k S k
W W W
                                                                                                                           (2.7) 
k stands for current , and k-1stands for the previous period , which means that wheQ Ws>0, the 
government procurement mechanism is a kind of Pareto Improvement , and when Ws<0, this government 
procurement mechanism may lead to regress in social efficiency .  
2.2. Parameter Design 
Table 2.1 Suppliers  Parameter Setting Table 
Environmental parameters Variable names 
Parameter 
value 
Environmental 
parameters Variable names 
Parameter 
value 
Cost of production c \ Price p \ 
Fixed cost f 1-10 Wealth level wealth 0 
Variable cost t 1 Successful tag variable zhongbiao 1 
Scientific and technological progress 
coefficient w \ 
   
 
Table 2.2 Operating Environment Parameter Setting Table 
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Environmental parameters Variable names 
Parameter 
value Environmental parameters 
Variable 
names 
Parameter 
value 
Total consumption of resources resource \  of level of science and technology High-tel \ 
The government's total 
Expenditure for procurement Gov-expend \ 
 of intermediate
level of science and technology Mid-tel \ 
The g s subsidies 
amount r 0.5 
 of lower of 
science and technology Low-tel \ 
 total 200  Social efficiency Social efficiency \ 
The number of successful 
 select 30 
   
 
3. Simulation Experiment 
3.1. Experiment Operation 
(1) The First Set  of Experiments 
 According to their production functions, all suppliers  offered their approved procurement target prices 
to the government .  The government  sorted all the price information given by suppliers  in descending 
order.  One unit of the original wealth level of each of the following 30 suppliers  will be deducted 
automatically . 
(2) Second Set  of Experiments 
 The  published the green procurement  standard to the simulation market, which meant 
that only the suppliers  whose fixed cost was over 7.05  would be permitted to take part in the government 
procurement activities and could their procurement target prices be held as valid .  suppliers  that met the 
green procurement  standard offered their approved procurement target prices to the  according 
to their production functions.  The government  sorted all the price information given by suppliers  in 
descending order.  The  selected the first 30 suppliers  to participate in the final procurement 
activities, while one unit of each of the original wealth level of the rest will be deducted automatically .  
(3) The Third Set  of Experiments 
 The  published the green procurement  standard to the simulation market, which meant 
that only if their fixed cost over 7.05 would suppliers  be permitted to take part in the government 
procurement activities and could the procurement target prices offered by them be held as valid .  suppliers  
that met the green procurement  standard offered their approved procurement target prices to the  
according to their production functions.  The government  subsidized  all suppliers  whose fixed costs 
were over 7.5 with their prices being deducted 0.5 units. Then the final price  of the procurement target from 
those suppliers  was obtained.  The government  sorted all the price given by selected suppliers  in 
descending order.  The  selected the first 30 suppliers  to participate in the final procurement 
activities. And the rest selected suppliers  and non-selected suppliers  could not get the procurement orders 
from the government  with one unit of each of their original wealth level being deducted automatically  by 
 
 
b After several times of simulation experiments, we found out dominant  and 
prominent  if the value of this parameter is 7.05 . 
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the simulation model. 
3.2. Analysis for the Experimental Results 
1 The First Category of Indicators 
In 10000 times of each set of experiments, three kinds of original simulation data were separately gained, 
activities, the sum of all kinds of limited 
social resources consumed in government procurement activities, and output efficiency of resources of the 
whole society after government procurement activities. And the relevant information about the first category of 
indicators was gained as follow. 
Table 3.1 Measure value description of first category of indicators from the original simulation data  
Experiment Statistical indicators mean median central tendency 
standard 
deviation skewness kurtosis 
First Set of 
Experiments 
Expenditure for 
procurement 55.54 55.50 obvious 1.30 0.24 2.62 
Total consumption of 
resources 14.45 14.49 obvious 0.29 -0.36 2.62 
Social efficiency 3.85 3.83 obvious 0.14 0.44 2.66 
The second Set of 
Experiments 
Expenditure for 
procurement 22.29 22 obvious 3.98 0.28 3.18 
Total consumption of 
resources 17.94 18 obvious 3.88 0.15 3.87 
Social efficiency 159.77 160 obvious 5.04 -0.17 3.60 
The third Set of 
Experiments 
 
 
 
remark 
Expenditure for 
procurement 250.47 250.19 obvious 4.94 0.39 2.68 
Total consumption of 
resources 2.21 2.21 obvious 0.02 -0.16 2.77 
Social efficiency 113.11 112.87 obvious 2.90 0.38 3.06 
- normal distribution 
In the first set of experiment, the distribution of expenditure for procurement and social efficiency from 
original simulation data is more right-skewed than normal distribution, while the distribution of total 
consumption of resources from original simulation data is more left-skewed than normal distribution.  
In the second set of experiment, the distribution of expenditure for procurement from original simulation 
data is more right-skewed than normal distribution. The distribution of resources consumption from original 
simulation data is more left-skewed. The social efficiency is as right-skewed as expenditure for procurement.  
In the third set of experiment, the distributions of three indicators are as same degree in skewness as that in 
first experiment.  
2 The Second Category of Indicators 
(1)Measure value description 
In 10000 times of the each 
l was gained. Details are shown as follow. 
Table 3.2 Measure value description of second category of indicators from the original simulation data  
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Experiment  mean median central tendency 
standard 
deviation 
skewness kurtosis 
First Set of 
Experiments 
advanced 22.29 22 obvious 3.98 0.28 3.18 
intermediate 17.94 18 obvious 3.88 0.15 3.87 
lower 159.77 160 obvious 5.04 -0.17 3.60 
The second Set of 
Experiments 
advanced 88.02 88 obvious 7.27 0.09 3.14 
intermediate 86.38 86 obvious 7.01 -0.38 2.56 
lower 25.60 26 obvious 4.24 0.35 3.83 
The third Set of 
Experiments 
advanced 113.45 113 obvious 6.94 -0.05 2.47 
intermediate 63.78 64 obvious 6.55 -0.20 3.02 
lower 22.77 23 obvious 4.02 -0.07 2.74 
remark - verifies all the original data is not normal distribution 
In the first set of experiment, i
ntific and technological level differed in a tiny degree, showing that the 
degree of numbers of suppliers of lower scientific and technological level is the maximal. The distributions of 
numbers of suppliers of advanced and intermediate scientific and technological level are more right-skewed 
than normal distribution, while the distribution of numbers of suppliers of lower level is more left-skewed than 
normal.  
In the second set of experiment, it can be seen from the table that the dispersion degree of numbers of 
 is relatively the minimal. The distribution of number 
o normal distribution. The distribution 
 level is left-skewed, while the 
 is right-skewed.  
In the third set of experiment, it can be seen from the table that the dispersion degree of numbers of 
 is minimal, a same result as in the second group 
experiment. The distributions of numbers of three types of technology suppliers are all left-skewed than normal 
distribution, differing in degree from each other.  
(2) Effect chart analysis 
  
a. first  b. second  c.  
Fig.3.1 effect chart of the distribution of the level of scientific and technological progress in the three set of experiments 
It can be seen from Figure 3.4(a) s of 
three types of technology 
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is not so obvious. Though numbers of 
completely eliminated in this government procurement mechanism designed under the principle that consider 
 
It can be seen from Figure 3.4(b) 
scientific and technological level much less than the other two types, and the difference between number of 
frequently-
technological level relatively the minimal, it is not completely eliminated in this government procurement 
 
It can be seen from Figure 3.4(c)  of experiments, the variation tendencies of numbers 
of three types of technology suppliers are basically stable. In accordance with the number sorted in descending 
order, the three types of suppliers can be ranked as: . In addition, there 
and technological level dominate the leading position in this government procurement mechanism under the 
 
4. Conclusion  
From technological perspective, the design and construction of the simulation model of government 
procurement should be emphasized, since simulation experiments can help figure out what is important in an 
economy and how can we improve it. The government should carry out a simulation run of its new programs 
and assess the virtual effect of the experimental results in accordance with the predetermined criteria initially 
before the government makes changes and innovations to the procurement mechanism. Furthermore, the 
government should try to develop the simulation model of the government procurement into a "multi-
dimensional, multi-threaded, multi-tasking" and Interactive learning model. It is highly valued that the 
government underlines running and debugging during the process of operation simulation and effect evaluation 
of the mechanism by the simulation model of government procurement. 
From the practical perspective, emphasis should be put on the refinement and detail-selection of the 
mechanism design of the government procurement. It is reasonable that the government pays attention to the 
refinement and details selection of the mechanism design of the government procurement. In addition, constant 
changes and bold innovations of the mechanism design should be achieved. It is sensible that the government 
opens its mind subjectively to design the mechanism with a changing and innovative way of thinking. 
Additionally, the government has the responsibility and obligation to assume this guidance and support, which 
requires the government to focus on the advancement and foresight of the mechanism design of the government 
procurement. 
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